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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
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LESri'ER BELL, D. B. STRINGHAM, ) 
ARLEN BELL, and MEL VIN BROWN, 




STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
ri'his is an action for wilful trespass in which the 
plaintiff landowner seeks an injunction against and dam-
ag-es from the defendant deer hunters, who deny plain-
t i [f's right to control access to and nse of his own priv-
nfrl v own<>d lands. 
DI8POSIT10N IN LOvVER COURT 
P'ollowing tlw trial of this case to the Court sitting 
\\ it!1out a jury on Sqlkrnher 14, 19G7 and filing of memo-
1 nrnla by hoth eonns('I, the Court t>ntered its Findings 
(lj' Wnd, Cmwlnsions of Law and .Jndgment, holdi:ng that 
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a trail or road referred to herein as the ridge road was 
not a public way and that defendants were guilty of a 
trespass by traveling upon said road. However, tlw 
Court also held that a road or trail referred to herein 
as the Davenport Canyon road is a public road and the 
obstruction of that road hy plaintiff was wrongful, bar-
ring recovery of punitive damages. Plaintiff was awarded 
compensatory damages of $10.00 for trespass upon thn 
ridge road hut costs were assessed against him. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of that part of the judg-
ment which holds that the Davenport Canyon road is a 
public way and which denied plaintiff's right to punitive 
damages or crn;;ts. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff is the owner of approximately 20,000 acres 
of fenced lands on the east slope of Monte Cristo Moun-
tain in Cache County, Utah, including Sections 15, lG, 
22, 27, 28, and 29, Township 9 North, Range 4 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. ('T. 83). Sections 20 and 
21 in that township are federally mvrn'd, and a spring· 
kno-\vn as Buck Springs is located within SPction 20 
about one-qnartc'r mik sonthwt>st of the southwest eorn<>r 
of vlaintiff's SPction 16. er. 8:3, Pl. Exh. 7). All grazing-
rights in tlw Huek Springs an'a an' lPaf'P(l Pxe1nsi\'e1y 
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to plaintiff by the United States Forest Service for 
a thrPe-month period Pach year. 
Enck Springs can he reached from the south by four-
wh(~P l drive vehicles over a trail which originates upon 
plaintiff's property and which divides to become the 
ridge mad and Dannport Canyon road. The area may 
also be reached from the north through Blacksmith Fork 
Canyon. (T. 45). A road from the west comes within one-
half mile of Buck Springs but does not extend to the 
:-:pring itself. (T. 8!5). 
The ridge road was opened and used by plaintiff 
1YhPn he homesteaded part of this property in 1932. Both 
tlw ridge road and the Davenport Canyon road were 
thrn and are now necessary for the movement of sheep 
camps in the normal herding of plaintiff's five bands of 
:-:lwep. Plaintiff, alone, has maintained these roads for 
this 1mrpose, and occasionally he has hired men to help 
with this work. (T.172-178). No otlwr stockrnen use these 
roads except whf•n trading labor with plaintiff or locat-
ing stray sheep which have wandPrPd to plaintiff's herds. 
( '11. 21 G, 217). No otlwr grazing pPrmittees of the Na-
tional Forest have stock drivPways on, across, or through 
plaintiff's lands. (T. 216). 
TirnbPr lta:s i1Pver lwPn ltarvPsted from this area, so 
Uw roads \Yf'I'P nevPr hnilt nor used for that pnrposP. 
('I'. 4:\). Nor do the roads ronn0ct highways or romrnnn-
ities; they only provide access to Buck Springs for plain-
tiff, his herds, sheep camps, and employees. Forest Serv-
ice personnel also have used the roads with plaintiff'~ 
rxpress perrrnss10n. 
For many years the plaintiff expressly permitted 
rertain deer hunters to hunt and travel upon his lands. 
However, due to the improving and paving of Utah High-
way 39 from Ogden to W oodrnff, plaintiff's property 
for the first time became easil,\· accessible to large mnn-
h<'rs of iwople wl10 had not vreviously hunted there. 
Also the dPvelopnwnt and widespread ownership of four-
wheel drive trucks and jeeps for the first time permitted 
large numbers of hunters to travel by vehicle to places 
to which they formerly had not gone except on foot or 
h,\· saddle horse. (T. 75). For example, defendant Lester 
Ht>ll testified that prior to 1955 he rode to Buck Springs 
l>~· saddle horse but that since that year he has gone 
hy automobile because of the convenience to himself. 
(T. 194). 
In addition to such greater accessibility of plain-
ti t'f's lands, the proper authorities have in recent years 
authorized different classes of hunting and extended and 
multiple hunting seasons for various game birds and 
animals, thus greatly extending the period of inconven-
i<·nce and interference with vlaintiff's sheep business. 
]~ow-and-arrow hunting for deer, for example, begins in 
.\ ngust. There is a three-month chukar and partridgP 
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season, a sage hen season, a pine hen season, a regular 
deer season followed by elk season, and, occasionally, 
a late deer season. (T. 37, 73). 
A vastly increased personal injury danger brought 
on by the increased number of hunts and hunters was 
forcefull~v brought home to plaintiff in about 1954 when 
his son John was shot and wounded by a deer hunter. 
(T. 41, 72). About two years later a bullet was also 
fired into one of the plaintiff's buildings, just over the 
heads of his employees. (T. 41-42). 
Also, over the past few years plaintiff sustained loss 
to personal property when hunters killed his sheep and 
Rtole his gasoline during the hunting season. (T. 72, 108, 
110). Plaintiff's ewes, managed in five separate bands, 
have been repeatedly chased and stampeded about, caus-
ing them to lose flesh, trample feed, and become separ-
ated from their lambs. When forage is so trampled, it 
loses its value as livestock feed and cannot be profitably 
utilized that season. (T. 73, 108, 162). This loss of for-
uge and the increased fire hazard were discussed on cross 
«xamination b~' defendants' witness Clark Anderson, 
United 8tatPs J<'orest 8ervirt> 8upervisor of the area dur-
ing the period from 1939 to 1966: 
''. .. Roy Stoker often went ... down into these 
deer camps (at Burk Springs) to get a license 
number off of a camp or advise them to clean 
np the an•a or during the deer season to be careful 
with fin'. T mean dnring the <leer season. 
Q: That's a real hazard, is it not? 
A: Yes. And the littering and the fire hazard 
was the main reason for - I wouldn't say servic-
ing. It was mainly to visit the people and solicit 
their cooperation. 
Q: It's a fact, Clark, is it not, of your own 
observation that this use has increased tremend-
ously since you first went up there in 1932? 
A: l should say. 
Q: And that hazard now has multiplied many 
fold over what it was then? 
A: \' <->ry much. 
Q: Both as to sheep and to the forage. vVould 
you, Clark, as a man who actually has been in 
charge of the use of this forage, agree with tlw 
testimony of Nick that ·when you spook these sheep 
and cause them to move rapidly in fresh feed areas 
they practically destroy it? 
A: They surely fix it so that the sheep coming 
hehind them vvon't do anything except pick at it. 
Of cours(', they g<->t som<-> use at it, bnt it's rni11i-
mnrn. 
Q: Mayhe tPn lJPr c<->nt of what they otlwrwisP 
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A: They damage the forage. 
Q: Substantially, don't they~ 
A: Substantially." (R. 1G2). 
rrhe fire hazard mentioned threatens the plaintiff's range, 
his liHstock, and his home. (T. G3, 89, 107, 162). 
The transcript is replete with evidence of damage 
done by hunten; traveling upon plaintiff's roads, neces-
sary to the movement of his sheep camps. During dry 
hunting seasons, traffic on the roads causes dust to rise 
from the road and settle upon the forage, making it un-
palatable until washed by rain. (T. 105). And in wet 
hunting seasons the hunters' four-wheel drive vehicles, 
with chains applied to all four wheels, cut deep ruts in 
the roads, making them impassable except to similar ve-
hicles and opening them to serious erosion. ( T. 33, 38, 76, 
108, 154-55). No governmental unit provides mainten-
ance for these roads, so the plaintiff is obliged to repair 
tlwm at his own expense so he can use them, even though 
liP carefully avoids traveling upon them during wet 
weatlwr. (T. 81). The plaintiff testified: 
"A : You know these four-wheel drives are made 
to be off the road and not on the road very often, 
and they go, these four-wheel drives, any place to 
pick up a dPer ~where we had to pick it up on a 
~:ad<llP horse, and now these guys never have no 
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horse any more. That's the way they pick their 
deer up. So any time you make a track you're 
going to cause erosion. You can't help it. I can 
take you np there and show you roads now where 
they claim this is part of the roads. What do the1 
do in the fall of the year when it's wet? Wln: . . ' 
they're that deep now. Yon can't hardly get out 
of the rut. Just because, making these tracks and 
washing out all the time, that's what hap1wns 
wh0n it rains. 
Q: Is it possible for touring cars to use this 
particular road ·we're talking about? 
A: It's almost too high-center now for pickups, 
let alonP an automobile. It's impossible. 
Q: Has this road been - the ruts in the road -
ht>-en d(•epened by thf'se deer hunters, including tlH' 
defendants?- Made deeper, the rub:;? 
A: r:l'hat's just what they do. It doesn't help 
any. That's exactly ·what they're doing. It don't 
make no difference how wet the roads are. Yon 
can't get over there and hack with a two-wheel 
drive, but these four-wheel drives, they pnt four 
chains on it and they get over therf' and hack, hnt 
they jnRt tear everything U]J. 
Q: \:Vhen it is wet, is it ofh1 n wet dnrinp; tlw 
fall hunting ReaRon '? 
Q: And when that condition PXiRtR I ask ~'OU if 
:-·011 ;.;t:i ~·off tlw road ymn·;.;(•l!'. 
A: We don't go down it unless we absolutely 
have to. We don't drive nothing on these roads." 
(T. 75, 76). 
As a result of the overwhelming and rapidly multi-
plying difficulties set forth above, plaintiff in 1964 de-
(·]ared his lands closed to hunting. He published notices 
in local papers and posted his property with appropriate 
i'igns. er. Hi, 78). He posted a large sign at the cattle 
p:mtrd entering his property and stretched a cable with 
:,:i.!!,'n attached across the road leading to the ridge and 
Davc•nport Canyon roads. (rr. 77, 78, 87). 
During the 1965 deer hunting season, defendants 
LPster Bell and Arlen Bell were apprehended by plain-
tiff's agents, Sam Chournos and Thain Grow, going 
around the end of this cable as they were returning to 
Utah Highway 39 in their four-wheel drive vehicle. (T. 5, 
fi, :iO). They ·wt>re at that time informed that they were 
tn·spassing and ·were requested to cease. The following 
.\·<'ar dPf Pndants B('ll and Stringham were encountered 
at Buck Springs by Sam Chournos and Robert Whitney 
who had follm\'Pd tlwir vf'hicles' tracks in the snow. All 
dd<'rnlants had crosst>d plaintiff's land, again circling the 
('ahlP, to enter and ]Pave Buck Springs b)7 thP ridge road. 




THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT 
THE RIDGE ROAD WAS NOT A PUBLIC WAY BUT 
ERRED IN RULING THE DAVENPORT CANYON 
ROAD HAD BEEN DEDICATED TO PUBLIC USE. 
After hearing the evidence, the Trial Court found, 
inter alia: 
"In view of the fact that the said Davenport Can-
yon Road is shown on a map which was made 
as early as 1889, the Court finds that said road, 
within the bottom of Davenport Canyon is a public 
road .... " (R. 48). 
This map (Def. Exh. 18) was identified by defend-
ants' witness Zuberbuhler of the United States Forest 
Service. On direct examination he described the im-
portant landmarks appearing on the map thusly: 
"Q: Does that show 8ections 27 and 28 in the 
townships you've indicatP<l '~ 
A: 1t doP:-;. 
Q: And does it show the trails m th<~ an•a at 
that timP? 
A : 1 t dot>i'. 
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Q: And on Sections 27 and 28, does it show a 
road and a trail~ 
A: It shows a road running . . . in a general 
northerly direction through Section 27 and a trail 
taking off to the northwest into Section 21." (R. 
119, 120), (Emphasis addPd.) 
The road spoken of is the Ogden-Woodruff road, 
Utah Highway 39, which has since been much improved. 
r:I:'lw trail is that which the Court now declares a public 
mad. 
On cross examination the witness reiterated his 
statement that the broken line shown on the exhibit ex-
tending from Section 27 into Section 21 was a trail and 
not a road. (T. 127). He also testified that the origin-
ators of the trail could not be identified, and he could 
not say whether they were human, livestock, or game 
animals. (T. 128, 130). Nothing on the map indicates the 
width of the trail (T. 129) or, obviously, the frequency 
of its use. The exhibit (Def. Exh. 18) relied upon, as 
HtarkPd in purplP b~' Mr. Zuberbuhler, shows that this 
troil ended at the center of Section 21 and did not con-
timw to Huck Springs, approximately one rmle distant 
in the northeast qnarter of Section 20. This distance is 
:;;iµ;nifirant bPcanse it shows that approximately half of 
iii<" pn•spnt Davenport Canyon road was not even in exist-
('ll<'t' at tlw fo1w of the mm survPy. Yet tJ1P Court used 
tlic' smTPY al'\ tlw hnsis for deelaring the entirP road to 
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be public. This in no way changes the fact that the 
more recent maps, as would be expected, show that the 
road established for the first time by the plaintiff goes 
all the way to Buck SpringR. 
Defendants' witness Clark Anderson testified that 
so far as he knows there -was no road down Davenport 
Canyon wlwre he firnt WPnt there in 1932. (T. 165). 
Plaintiff's witnesses testified that only a trail exists even 
yet, although four-wheel drive vehicles and "tote gates" 
ean travel npon it. er. !10, 58). 
Upon this incomplete and unsatisfactory evidence 
the Lower Court drew the inference that this road had 
been continuously used by the public since prior to 1878 
and upon that basis implied a dedication of the road 
through its entire length to a perpetual public use. The 
more probable inferenees under all the circumstances are 
that this trail was a game trail or a livestock trail used 
hy livestoek or livestoekrnen claiming private rights to 
the immediate an--a. Nothing in the rt>cord will support 
a finding of the rPquisitP ten yPars' continuous use as 
a pnhli<' thorougl1farP as r<'qnirPd hy statute, Utah CodP 
An not. ( 19!):1) '.27-12-89. 1'l 1P \rnrd t710ro11,r1hfare, rnwd 
in the statuk, irnpli<'S a road lPading from on<> corn-
rnunit.'· to anotlwr. rl1his Conrt stated in Lindsay La11d 
and Li?:esfock Com7Jr111.11 1.'. (}71011rnos, 7;) Utah 38"1, 285 
T)ac. G4G (19:10): 
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""YV e think the evidence established a general pitb-
lic itse of the road. If the claim rested alone upon 
the use of the road for sawmill purposes or for 
the trailing of sheep, the question would be more 
difficult. Bid here the road connected two points 
between which there was occasion for consider-
able public travel. The road was a public con-
venience." (Emphasis added.) 
Rimilarly in Jeremy v. Bertagrwle, 101 Utah 1, 116 
P2d 420 (1940), involving the East Canyon Road which 
connects United States Highways 30 (S) and 40, the 
Court found from the record that the road was used by 
ranchers, stockmen, owners of adjacent property, and 
by the public generally for all convenient purposes, in-
duding pedestrian, equestrian, and vehicular traffic. 
rrhis case is clearly distinguishable, for the Court here 
fonnd a trail to be public that ended in a remote section 
of public domain without receiving any evidence of the 
use to which the trail was placed, the continuity and 
frequency of use, or the classes of persons using the 
trail. Had it joined two communities, as in Lindsay, 
supra, and Boyer v. Clark, 7 U2d 395, 236 P2d 107 
(1958), an inference that a connecting road was publicly 
wwd would be justified since the requirements of citi-
zens of communities dictate continuous travel back and 
forth. 1'his inference cannot arise concerning the use 
of the Davenport Canyon trail prior to 1879, however, 
a::; no snch needs are or could be shown. This Court 
in Hoyer, supra, emphasized the statutory requirement 
111at nsng-<> he co11ti 111w11s. There is no evidence concern-
14 
ing the Davenport Canyon road to show a continuous use 
except by plaintiff. Defendants made only a "half a 
dozen" trips across this road dnring the last ten or elevPn 
years. (T. 200). \\There, as here, an encroachment and 
interference with private property is songht to be ap-
proved, such a use shonld not he assumed without Pvi-
dencP. ri1}Wr(' is none hPl'l'. 
A road to he public must be clcdicated by its owner 
to public use. Such a dedication may be oral or written 
or inferred from circumstances, but, in all cases, it must 
hf~ shown that the landowner knew of the public use and 
intended to grant the right-of-way to the public. Morris 
v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, mt P 1127 (19Hi); Hall v. North 
Ogdrn City, 109 Utah 325, 175 P2d 703 (1946). Nothing 
could he further from the fact in this case. It is clear 
that neither plaintiff nor his predecessors dedicated the 
road for th<> use of the pnhlic. Prior to 1964 persons on 
his lands wPre there b.v invitation, and a private right 
cannot lw made public so!Pl)r hy tlw intent of the user~ 
absPnt the m•cpssar:-· intPnt of tlw mvnPr. As to usage by 
adjoining landownPrs and Fol'<•st Hervice officials, their 
use was private in nature and could not ripen into a pub-
lic use. Morris 1'. Blunt, supra. Fnrtlwrmore, a pnblir 
use as a trail for travPI on foot or on horseback cannot 
he the hasis for a pnhlie roadwa:-· for motor vehieh•s. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING COSTS 
TO PLAINTIFF AND IN REFUSING TO ASSESS 
PUNITIVE DAJHAGE AGAINST DEFENDANTS. 
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The findings show plainly the court's reason for 
assessmg costs to plaintiff and refusing him punitive 
damages: 
It is further concluded that the . . . Davenport 
Canyon road was and is a public road and plain-
tiff vrns without lawful authority to prohibit de-
fendants from the use of said road .... 
* * * 
Since the said cable obstruction placed by plain-
tiff across the said Davenport road was unlawful, 
he is not entitled to any punitive damages against 
the defendants .... " (R. 49, 50). 
It is appellant's position that the court's premise was 
faulty and the result was accordingly incorrect. 
This jurisdiction allows the assessment of punitive 
or f'xemplary damage for willful and malicious trespass. 
Pouwrs v. Taylor, 14 U. 2d 152, 379 P. 2d 380 (1963). 
'Chat case involved a trespass by defendant's horses 
following protests by plaintiff. The court there pointed 
out that one reason for such damages is the warning 
mine to others. Cf., Evans v. Gaisford, 122 Utah 156, 
'.247 P. 2d 431 (1952). This is especially applicable in the 
instant situation since the plaintiff is put to great trouble 
and Pxpense to protect his rights and without some such 
aid hY the leo-al sYstem, the prosecution of each un-
. b . 
dd<'nvd trespasser may become an unbearable financial 
~train upon th<~ lanclowner and afford him only illusory 
!'(jl i pf. 
16 
That the dPfendants' actions were willful and mali-
cious can be seen by their tPstimony. Each year they 
saw and deliberately went around plaintiff's no hunting -
no trespassing signs and the cable. (T. 202). Each year 
defendants Bell were contaeted by plaintiff's agents and 
informed on their trespass hut tlH•y refnsed to stop tres-
passing. 1'1H• Bells' experi<>rn·e in 19G5 ,,-as related to 
defendant 8tringham lrnt lH' neYertheless joined in thP 
1966 trespass. er. 201, 20:2). Defendants Bell saw the 
printed notices the plaintiff placed in local newspapers 
( T. lG) but, that notwithstanding, they and the other 
defendant continued to go upon plaintiff's property with-
out permission and they expressed to plaintiff's ag<>nts 
their intention to continue doing so. 
Upon the erroneous premis(~ that the Davenport 
Canyon road was public, the trial court assessed to plain-
tiff the costs of the action. Plaintiff was entitled to 
pn~vail, as noted above, on the issue of his right to 
exclude defendants from his lands and plaintiff slwul<l, 
therefor(~, have lwen awarded his costs. 
( ~ONC'L1TS1 ON 
1'he jndg1rn-'nt of tlw trial court m declaring tlw 
Da,renport Can~·on road to lw pnhlie \\·as Nroneons. ]t 
is not supportPd hy tlw p\·i<l('1we in this n·cord. 1t siionld 
he rPvers<•d as a matter of la\\· as slwnld also tlw related 
eonclnsion that plaintiff <'onkl not re<·ovPr <>xe111plary 
<larnaµ;es or <·nsts. 
17 
Respectfully submitted, 
Milton A. Oman and H. James Clegg 
Seventh Floor, Continental 
Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
